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L
atin American countries have undergone
significant financial sector reforms since
the early 1990s. Despite significant
advances in liberalizing financial markets
and the overall positive impact of liberal-
ization on the allocation of credit toward
growing economic activities, financial markets remain
shallow, suggesting that further reform is still needed.1
One candidate for further reform is the protec-
tion of creditor rights. In their seminal research on
creditor rights, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) show
that creditor protection in Latin American countries
is extremely weak. In this paper we argue that the
protection of creditor rights is an area in which
Latin American countries should undertake major
reform in order to exploit the advantages of deep
and stable financial markets.
To illustrate the importance of creditor rights, a
basic contract can be considered. The basic credit
contract involves three players: the creditor, the
debtor, and the institutions that guarantee that
each of the other parties will live up to its responsi-
bilities. If institutions are inadequate, it is likely that
the benefits that the other parties have to gain from
reneging on the debt contract can be so pro-
nounced that they prevent the realization of the
contract. Hence, the ability of these institutions to
align the players’ incentives with the clauses of the
debt contract can become an engine for promoting
financial depth. In fact, the rights of creditors to the
assets pledged as collateral have a major role in
explaining the depth of financial markets, the allo-
cation of credit among different groups of investors,
and the way the allocation and amount of credit
react to economic shocks. Several recent papers,
moreover, have shown the importance of these rela-
tionships. This paper surveys empirical evidence on
the impact of creditor rights protections on credit
markets, small and medium-sized enterprises’
access to credit, and credit volatility and relates it
to the Latin American experience.
In addition to the considerations above, the
degree to which creditors are protected can have an
impact on how other types of reforms affect financial
markets. Galindo, Micco, and Ordoñez (2002), for
example, show that the impact of financial liberaliza-
tion on economic growth depends on the quality of
underlying institutions. In particular, they show that
financial liberalization has little impact in countries
where creditor rights are unprotected. This paper
does not address that issue, however, but rather con-
centrates on the direct effects of creditor protections
on financial markets.
The paper first documents the state of creditor
protection in Latin America and then discusses evi-
dence on the impact of creditor protection on the
size of financial markets, the impact on small and
medium-sized debtors of enhancing creditor rights,
and the impact of creditor rights regulations on the
dynamics of financial markets.
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tive protection. Once rule of law is factored in, the
conditions for Latin America look even worse
because creditor rights in the region are not only
weak but also barely enforced. On the basis of this
methodology, it is only fair to say that creditor pro-
tection in Latin America is extremely weak.
Creditor Rights and Financial Breadth
S
everal research papers have linked creditor rights
protection to financial depth.2The main argument
behind this relationship is that the protection of
creditor rights guarantees an environment in which
creditors and debtors will wish to pursue financial
contracts. Creditor rights protection stimulates both
lenders and borrowers to enter into financial contracts
and to abide by their clauses and thus constitutes
an essential ingredient of financial development.
Consequently, advocates of creditor rights–
oriented regulations claim that if the right to repos-
sess collateral in case of debtor default is not strictly
protected, the use of collateral will lose its important
role in solving the information asymmetries that can
lead to credit rationing and underinvestment.3
Theoretical findings regarding the role played by
collateral in mitigating problems derived from
asymmetric information are based on the presump-
tion that collateral can be repossessed by the cred-
itor in case of default. That is, it is presumed that a
third party stands ready to protect and enforce the
creditor’s security interest on the collateral stipu-
lated in the debt contract. The right to repossess
collateral and efficiency in doing so act as a threat
that can ensure that borrowers will not engage in
inadequate behaviors, and this threat can serve to
align the borrower’s incentives with the clauses of
the contract. If lenders feel that regulations do not
protect them and that their chance of taking control
over the assets pledged as collateral is uncertain,
they are likely to prefer not to extend credit since the
implicit bankruptcy risk will severely reduce their
expected earnings. Under these circumstances,
credit rationing will resurface. Therefore, countries
with a higher degree of creditor protection can be
expected to enjoy deeper debt markets since they
can take advantage of the use of additional nonin-
terest clauses such as collateral to mitigate prob-
lems derived from information asymmetries.
The creditor rights measure developed by La Porta
et al. has been used in several studies to address a
number of important questions. La Porta et al. exam-
ine the impact of creditor rights regulations on the
size of credit markets and explore the determinants
of creditor rights, reaching the conclusion that legal
systems based on the French civil law tradition, as is
Creditor Rights in Latin America
R
ecent papers by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) have
given new impetus to the empirical discussion on
the importance of regulations regarding the rights of
creditors to borrowers’ assets by providing very valu-
able data on the state of creditor rights regulations
around the world. The La Porta et al. (1998) study
collects information on various regulations regarding
creditor rights protections. Using this information,
the authors construct an index that summarizes
regulations determining creditors’ rights to control
collateral in case firms file for reorganization or
bankruptcy. La Porta et al. consider whether (1) reg-
ulations impose an automatic stay on assets in case
of reorganization, (2) secured creditors have the right
to be paid first in case of bankruptcy, (3) regulations
require firms to consult with creditors before filing for
reorganization, and (4) regulations mandate removal
of the firm’s management during reorganization. A
positive response to each of the four elements of the
index is interpreted as creditor rights protection. It
should be noted that this measure goes beyond col-
lateral repossession exclusively since it focuses on
total asset liquidation in case of bankruptcy.
Table 1 summarizes the La Porta et al. creditor
rights measure for Latin American countries as
well as for the average level in Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
member and Southeast Asian countries. While this
measure illustrates the degree to which regulations
protect creditors, it might be insufficient given that
law enforcement can vary from country to country.
If one takes into account that law enforcement is
weak in Latin America, it is likely that creditors may
not enjoy de facto protection. To incorporate such
weakness in law enforcement into our measure of
creditor protection, we create a new index labeled
“effective creditor rights” that multiplies the La
Porta et al. creditors’ rights index by a “rule of law”
measure. The last column of Table 1 reports the val-
ues of this index for Latin American and Caribbean
countries, with higher values implying higher effec-
The protection of creditor rights is an area in
which Latin American countries should under-
take major reform in order to exploit the advan-
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the case for Latin American countries, tend to grant
less protection to creditors and more to debtors than
do systems based on the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition.
Empirical evidence further suggests that creditor
protection can have a significant impact on the devel-
opment of financial markets.4 In summary, after con-
trolling for relevant features such as inflation, past
economic growth, the size of the economy, and fiscal
imbalances, most empirical studies find a strong cor-
relation between creditor protection and financial
sector development.
In this section we report regressions similar to
those in La Porta et al. and in Padilla and Requejo
(2000) with a few variants. Following Galindo and
Micco (2001), first, we introduce the variables that
we call effective creditor rights 1 and effective
creditor rights 2, which are the interaction of the
rule of law variable and the creditor rights index and
Effective
Creditor rights Rule of law creditor rights
Argentina 0.00 0.54 0.00
Bolivia 0.00 0.13 0.00
Brazil 0.25 0.63 0.16
Chile 0.50 0.70 0.35
Colombia 0.00 0.21 0.00
Costa Rica 0.50 0.67 0.33
Dominican Republic 0.25 0.31 0.08
Ecuador 0.25 0.67 0.17
El Salvador 0.25 0.24 0.06
Guatemala 0.00 0.14 0.00
Honduras 0.25 0.21 0.05
Jamaica 0.25 0.35 0.09
Mexico 0.00 0.54 0.00
Panama 0.50 0.21 0.11
Paraguay 0.25 0.41 0.10
Peru 0.25 0.25 0.06
Trinidad and Tobago 0.25 0.67 0.17
Uruguay 0.50 0.50 0.25
Venezuela 0.50 0.64 0.32
Average Latin America 0.25 0.42 0.12
Average OECD 0.49 0.93 0.45
Average Southeast Asia 0.88 0.65 0.56
Notes: Creditor rights, rule of law, and effective creditor rights are normalized between 0 and 1.
Source: La Porta et al. (1997, 1998); Galindo and Micco (2001)
TABLE 1
Creditor Protection in Latin America
1. See Galindo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss (2002) for a discussion of financial liberalization and credit allocation.
2. See, for example, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), Padilla and Requejo (2000), and Galindo and Micco (2001). Galindo and Micco
develop a model in which the asymmetry of responses of credit markets to shocks is linked to the institutional setup; the
authors estimate the responses using a panel of over fifty countries, with information ranging from 1990 to 1999. 
3. Among many uses described thoroughly in Coco (2000), collateral can solve problems derived from asymmetries in valuation
of projects, uncertainty about the quality of projects and the riskiness of borrowers, and problems related to the cost of mon-
itoring or supervising the borrowers’ behavior. When not dealt with, these problems can lead to partial or complete credit
rationing. Collateral requirements can solve or at least mitigate the impact of these problems on the extension of credit. Such
requirements help to reduce asymmetric valuation problems, that is, the conflict that arises when borrowers and lenders dis-
agree about the true value of the project; reduce credit rationing since pledging collateral can convey information about bor-
rowers and about the projects to be financed; and alleviate moral hazard problems by adding a potential cost to borrowers if
they do not make their best effort to succeed.
4. La Porta et al., Padilla and Requejo (2000), and Galindo and Micco (2001) show that creditor protection can affect the size
of financial markets, the level of interest rates, and the level of nonperforming loans.32 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2004
The main result shown in Table 2 is evident. For a
number of reasons, better legal protections enhance
creditors’ ability to operate in risky environments
and increase the depth of credit markets. In summary,
credit markets are deeper because protections
increase the implicit value of collateral or, alternatively,
reduce liquidation costs in case of borrower default.
For example, lower protection reduces the possibility
of seizing collateral at low cost and hence reduces the
expected return to creditors in case of default. The
implicit increase in credit risk shrinks credit markets.
Basic macro controls such as inflation and budget
deficits are significant in most specifications with
the expected negative and positive sign, respectively,
suggesting that macroeconomic imbalances are harm-
ful for financial market development. Average growth
rates and the level of GNP are rarely significant.
In summary, this section has shown robust evi-
dence that confirms results previously presented in
the empirical literature. Countries with higher cred-
itor protection, stricter law enforcement, and more
efficient judicial systems tend to have deeper credit
markets than those where legal protections are weak.
Hence, there is a link through which legal protections
can affect the real economy. It is nonetheless worth
noting that, while these exercises provide some evi-
dence on the importance of creditor protection for
financial markets, they do not allow for conclusions
on what the best form of regulation is.
Creditor Protection and Access to Credit
I
nformational asymmetries tend to increase financial
restrictions for smaller creditors, who usually have
fewer assets to pledge as collateral, and the empiri-
cal evidence suggesting that “size matters” for finan-
cial constraints is extensive. The main intuition
behind this result is that smaller borrowers, as
opposed to large firms, are not able to internalize
many of the capital allocation functions carried out
by financial markets. Hence, financial development
may have a disproportionate impact on smaller firms.
In this section we review evidence of different
degrees of creditor rights protection on access to
credit for small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs). Results are drawn from Chong, Galindo, and
Micco (2004), who use the World Business Environ-
ment Survey (WBES) database (World Bank Group
2000) to explore the role of creditor protection on
SMEs’ access to credit. The WBES is a cross-country
firm-level survey conducted in fifty-four developed
of the efficiency of the judiciary and the creditor
rights indexes, respectively. These variables capture
the effects of law enforcement and efficient judicial
procedures on creditor regulation. Countries with
high creditor rights can lose their benefits if rules
and regulations are not enforced or if they are
enforced inefficiently. The rest of the variables are
similar to those in La Porta et al. In order to isolate
any possible cyclical effect from the dependent vari-
able, we take an average of private credit to GDP
during the 1990s.5 Following La Porta et al., we
include as controls the average growth rate since
1970 and the size of the economy proxied by the
1990s average of log(GNP); following Padilla and
Requejo we include in our regression the average of
inflation and the government’s deficit.
Table 2 presents our cross-country results. Each
column represents a different specification. As in
previous empirical studies, the creditor rights index
in itself appears significant at a marginal level.
The effective creditor rights indexes appear highly
significant, as do the rule of law, the efficiency of
the judiciary, the risks of contract repudiation and
of expropriation, and the property rights variables.
To some extent all of these variables reflect creditor
rights. Column (10) includes a variable constructed
using the principal components of all of the above,
and it also appears significant. Finally, the last col-
umn includes the legal origin of countries as regres-
sors because previous studies have shown that legal
origin is a good exogenous proxy for creditor pro-
tection. Column (11) shows the impact of different
legal origins on credit markets. The main result is
that countries whose legal systems are based on the
French civil tradition have shallower financial mar-
kets than others. As in La Porta et al., the finding
here is that common-law countries provide better
protection to creditors. 
Creditor rights protection stimulates both
lenders and borrowers to enter into financial
contracts and to abide by their clauses and
thus constitutes an essential ingredient of
financial development.
5. The variable “credit to private sector” is extracted from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and refers to finan-
cial resources provided to the private sector, such as through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and
other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. 33 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2004
Dependent variable: 
CREDIT/GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Log(GNP) 1.90 2.76 0.42 2.85 2.78 –0.80 –1.00 0.80 1.36 1.96 0.17
(1.19) (1.66) (0.30) (1.78)* (2.12)** (0.54) (0.66) (0.49) (0.76) (1.55) (0.09)
Growth GDP –51.56 –75.50 6.53 –61.32 –9.78 3.93 20.20 –2.40 –25.15 –53.90 25.23
(1.11) (1.46) (0.15) (1.23) (0.24) (0.10) (0.53) (0.06) (0.54) (1.36) (0.53)
Log(1 + inflation) –51.58 –60.10 –49.99 –55.80 –45.99 –40.41 –30.78 –35.57 –65.19 –41.44 –31.46
(1.71)* (1.72)* (2.23)* (1.67) (1.51) (2.41)** (1.96)* (2.62)** (2.13)** (1.43) (1.92)*
Budget deficit 3.11 4.28 2.38 4.18 3.35 2.30 1.94 2.96 3.29 3.69 2.14
(2.20)** (2.94)*** (1.82)* (2.93)*** (2.60)** (1.81)* (1.58) (1.82)* (1.87)* (2.94)*** (1.27)




Rule of law 18.66
(3.95)***
Effective creditor  9.83
rights 2 (1.72)*
Efficiency of  14.14
the judiciary (1.89)*
Risk of  22.93
expropriation (5.20)***














Constant 46.92 35.75 64.43 30.42 10.85 97.19 95.26 61.55 59.08 61.57 71.43
(1.23) (0.91) (1.86)* (0.76) (0.27) (2.69)*** (2.52)** (1.50) (1.30) (1.96)* (1.45)
Observations .52 .52 .53 .48 .49 .53 .53 .47 .47 .53 .41
R-squared 0.37 0.30 0.41 0.34 0.38 0.47 0.51 0.48 0.33 0.48 0.46
Notes: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level; ***
indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
Source: Galindo and Micco (2001)
TABLE 2
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In general, the results of the study indicate that,
in comparison to large firms, medium-sized and
small firms finance significantly less of their invest-
ment with bank credit. In fact, the share of bank
credit in smaller firms is on average lower than that
of medium-sized firms. However, the degree to
which smaller firms are constrained depends on the
quality of the regulatory framework, suggesting that
in countries where creditor rights are protected
(and enforced) smaller firms can access more bank
credit to finance their investment.
The overall evidence of this section suggests that
creditor protection tends to significantly reduce the
financing constraints of smaller and medium-sized
creditors. The ability to pledge collateral can be sub-
stantially more important for firms lacking internal
capital markets or other forms of access to formal
financial markets. Consequently, a reform aimed at
increasing creditor protections can not only increase
the size of financial markets and promote economic
growth but can also have a significant impact on
credit allocation and income distribution.
Creditor Rights and Financial Volatility
I
n addition to promoting the depth of credit markets
in general and reducing constraints on smaller and
medium-sized debtors in particular, credit protection
can also reduce the impact of adverse shocks over the
credit cycle. If creditor rights are protected, when
the economy faces an adverse shock that increases
credit risk, the extent to which credit contracts will
depend on the regulations regarding collateral repos-
session. If creditors cannot recover the collateral
pledged in case borrowers default, it is likely that the
overall increase in credit risk experienced during a
recession will be exacerbated by the fact that cred-
itors will not even be able to recover the collateral. In
such cases, the credit market overreacts to the exoge-
nous shock and credit strongly contracts.
To test the validity of this proposition, Galindo and
Micco (2001) construct a panel of information for the
1990–99 period for a sample of developed and devel-
oping countries. The panel is unbalanced because
of a lack of information on several years for some
countries, and it is confined to the 1990s to avoid the
impact of possible changes in regulation that cannot
be captured because the legal data are collected on
only one moment in time. Galindo and Micco find that
countries with lower effective creditor rights seem
to have lower credit volatility after controlling for
GDP volatility. Figure 2 suggests that the volatility
of real credit is amplified by low creditor rights. The
figure  shows how the standard deviation of the
growth of real credit is negatively and significantly
and developing countries in 1999. The survey
includes information on firm characteristics as well
as on entrepreneurs’ perceptions of several issues,
including access to financial markets.6
In particular, Chong, Galindo, and Micco test
whether the share of firms’ investment financed with
bank credit depends on legal protections and whether
the share of bank credit is affected by the size of
firms. The survey classifies firms into three groups.
Firms with fewer than 50 employees are labeled
small, those with more than 50 but fewer than 500 are
medium-sized, and firms with more than 5,000 are
large. Chong, Galindo, and Micco test whether the
interaction of different creditor protection measures
with the size of the firm influences the degree to
which investment is financed with bank credit.
The results are summarized in Figure 1, which
shows the estimated difference in bank credit finance
between small and medium-sized firms with respect
to large firms in countries with different levels of
effective creditor protection.7 The lighter-colored
columns show the difference in the share of financing
coming from banks between small and large firms for
different values of the creditor protection proxies,
and the darker columns show the difference in bank
financing between medium and large firms. In coun-
tries where the creditor protection measures are at
the minimum values of the index, small firms have
much less access to credit than large ones do. The
index falls as the creditor protection measure rises.
Chong, Galindo, and Micco’s results show that in a
country in the 20th percentile of effective creditor
protection, the difference in bank credit financing
between small and large firms is nearly 30 percentage
points, and the difference between medium-sized and
large firms is close to 11 percentage points. As effec-
tive creditor rights increase, the gap is closed. In fact,
according to their estimates, the difference in bank
credit between small and large firms in countries
with high creditor protection (75th percentile) is only
14 percentage points, and the difference between
medium and large is only 6 percentage points. 
Recent research has pointed out that financial
liberalization, in particular that of domestic
financial markets, has a positive impact only
in countries with strong creditor rights pro-
tection and enforcement.6. Previous uses of this database to test credit restrictions on small and medium-sized firms include Clarke et al. (forthcoming),
who analyze whether foreign banks affect credit to smaller firms, and Love and Mylenko (2003), who analyze whether credit
information registries affect financing constraints to these types of firms. This study follows an approach similar to those of
both previous studies.
7. The results plotted come from Tobit-type estimations, which take into account that our dependent variable is restricted to be
between 0 and 1. Given that the dependent variable in these regressions is naturally truncated between 0 and 1 (the share of
investment financed with bank credit), the empirical model is estimated using a standard two-limit Tobit model.
8. In the most formal analysis we deal with the potential inverse causality in this relation.
9. These results are derived from the formal econometric analysis of Galindo and Micco (2001).
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related to the effective protection of creditors when
controlling for the volatility of shocks that hit each
country.8 In terms of this sample, an improvement in
effective creditor rights from the 20th percentile to
the 80th percentile reduces credit volatility by almost
50 percent (from 9.2 percent to 4.8 percent).9
Galindo and Micco analyze the relationship
between credit fluctuations and shocks in a formal
econometric study and find that an increase in
almost any of the legal protection proxies discussed
above reduces the amplitude of the real credit
cycle. In particular, it is interesting to note the role
of effective creditor rights and specifically of credi-
tor rights in reducing the amplitude of the cycle
even when controlling for rule of law separately.
The authors find that countries with legal systems
of French origin tend to experience higher volatility
than common-law countries. These results imply
that credit is more stable in countries with strong
creditor legal protection. When credit markets are
hit by negative shocks, creditors in countries with
weak legal protection experience high losses since
they are not even able to seize the collateral pledge.
Such a loss translates into a strong contraction of
credit. On the other hand, in the face of positive
shocks, credit increases more in these countries
than elsewhere because there is an opportunity to
compensate for losses during downturns. In coun-
tries with strong legal protection, however, credit is

















































































































































































Small and Medium-Sized Firms’ Access to Credit Relative to Large Firms and Creditor Protection
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of both insufficient regulations and ineffectiveness
in enforcing those regulations. This paper surveys
existing evidence and provides new evidence on the
role of creditor protections in increasing the size,
the scope of access, and the stability of credit mar-
kets. The evidence presented suggests that stricter
creditor rights protections can contribute to
increasing the size of credit markets, reducing their
instability, and increasing access, especially for
small and medium-sized enterprises that naturally
tend to experience tighter financial constraints.
In addition to the areas of direct influence
explored in this paper, it is worthwhile to recognize
additional research pointing out how other types of
reforms require creditor rights protections to maxi-
mize their effectiveness. Recent research has pointed
out that financial liberalization, in particular that of
domestic financial markets (including liberalizing
interest rate caps, eliminating directed credit, and the
like), has a positive impact only in countries with
strong creditor rights protection and enforcement.
Creditor rights protections allow lenders to take
advantage of liberalization by granting them the
instruments to deal properly with credit risk.
The importance of rules and regulations that
govern credit contracts has been stressed time and
costs and hence experience lower losses than in
countries where protections are not in place.
The main intuition driving these results is that
weak creditor protection can exacerbate the increase
in credit risk that occurs naturally in recessions.
When economies are hit by adverse shocks and cred-
itors are not protected, lenders will disproportionately
reduce their lending given that when facing an
adverse economywide shock, such as a reduction in
the terms of trade or a reversal of international capi-
tal flows, their chances of recovering either their
loans or the collateral that guarantees them are slim.
Conclusions
I
t is common knowledge that many Latin Amer-
ican countries have gone through intense reform
processes during the past fifteen years, and many of
these reforms have been aimed at increasing the
size and stability of credit markets. The region’s
financial markets nonetheless remain comparatively
small and volatile, particularly with respect to other
emerging market economies.
Empirical research suggests that the protection
of creditor rights is an area in which much reform
must still be undertaken. In general, the protection
















































































































































































Credit Volatility and the Protection of Creditor Rights, 1990–2002
Note: The figure controls for the standard deviation of external shocks.
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again. Nonetheless, the reforms undertaken so far
have been insufficient. Several reasons explain the
inadequacy of reform in this area. First, there is not
one specific area to reform in order to achieve an
adequate framework for protecting creditors. Not
only do rules and regulations in different codes
regarding seizing collateral need to be reformed,
with all the complexity that these changes usually
involve in civil law countries, but also, and probably
more importantly, the judicial system needs to be
made more agile. With these goals in mind, several
analysts have formulated principles concerning an
adequate framework for secured transactions, and
the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development has drafted some basic principles to
define a well-functioning regulatory framework for
secured transactions. Such principles clearly note
the need to establish out-of-court remedies that
assure prompt, effective, and relatively less expen-
sive enforcement of creditor rights. However, the
civil law tradition also limits this alternative, making
it difficult (but not impossible) for lawmakers to
achieve a satisfactory reform. Despite these diffi-
culties, Eastern European countries such as
Romania and Estonia have been able to implement
many of these principles.
In addition to the problems noted above, the
political economy problem faced by policymakers
when deciding whether to execute these types of
reform is far from trivial. Despite the fact that
there is a certain degree of awareness on the
importance of this topic, there is also a great
degree of misunderstanding. In general the public
might view these sorts of policies as a way to redis-
tribute wealth in favor of the already-demonized
financial sector, which can lead to a loss of popu-
larity of such reforms. It is difficult to convince the
general public that stricter creditor protection is
equivalent to greater depositor protection given
that most of the funds lent by banks are obtained
through deposits. This issue, however, is a matter
for future research.
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